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Introduction: The politics of evidence-based policy in Europe’s 
‘migration crisis’  
Martin Baldwin-Edwards, Brad K. Blitz and Heaven Crawley 
 
On 18 April 2015, more than 800 people drowned in just one incident off the coast of 
Lampedusa as they tried to cross the Mediterranean to Europe from the North African 
coast. It was one of the deadliest shipwrecks on record. Just a few days earlier, 400 people 
died when their overcrowded boat capsized just off the Italian coast, bringing the death toll 
to more than 1,200 in a single week. Their deaths occurred during a period of increasing 
irregular boat migrations across the southern Mediterranean from Libya to Italy and a 
subsequent, and largely new, flow of refugees and other migrants crossing from Turkey to 
Greece.1 By the end of 2015, an estimated 3,771 people had lost their lives crossing the 
Mediterranean trying to reach Europe.2 
Although people have been crossing the Mediterranean by boat since at least the late 
1980s (Baldwin-Edwards 2006), the events of 2015 prompted a series of political initiatives 
by European Union institutions under the guise of a new European Agenda on Migration in 
response to the ‘migration crisis’. As the number of people arriving on Europe’s shores 
continued to rise during the course of 2015, reaching an estimated 1,008,616 by the end of 
the year, there was a simultaneous increase in the scale and intensity of political, policy and 
public concern. This was reflected not only in images of human misery and suffering that 
dominated newspapers, TV screens and social media feeds but also in increased public fears 
about the perceived economic, security and cultural threats of increased migration to Europe. 
Alongside the public outcry, various research bodies, the European Commission and 
international organizations including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) all invested heavily in improving 
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data and evidence production with a view to advancing a better understanding of the 
complexity of migration processes and, it was hoped, improve both the effectiveness and 
efficiency of policies themselves.  The IOM established a Global Migration Data Analysis 
Centre in Berlin and gathered data on deaths in transit, including previously neglected 
reporting on deaths at sea. The UNHCR, which had an under-developed statistical division 
that had frequently been surpassed by the work of the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), also began to capture better data on flows 
and the distribution of refugees across Europe.  The UK, Swedish, German and other 
governments also publicised their interest in gathering data and new empirical information 
that could guide policy approaches to migration in Europe.  These developments signalled a 
step change in the reporting of migration flows to Europe and emphasised the importance of 
research-based evidence for managing humanitarian situations.   
 
The commitment to evidence-based policy  
The focus on evidence-based policy (EBP) is, of course, nothing new.  The term gained 
political currency in the UK under the Blair administration, starting in 1997, and was 
intended to signify the entry of a government with a modernising mandate, committed to 
replacing ideologically-driven politics with rational decision making (Sutcliffe and Court 
2005; Wells 2007).  For example, the Modernising Government White Paper (1999) states 
that: 
‘... policy decisions should be based on sound evidence. The raw ingredient of evidence 
is information. Good quality policymaking depends on high quality information, 
derived from a variety of sources – expert knowledge; existing domestic and 
international research; existing statistics; stakeholder consultation; evaluation of 
previous policies ...’ (Cabinet Office 1999, 31 cited in Wells 2007, 24).   
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The pursuit of EBP is, therefore, based on the premise that policy decisions should be better 
informed by available evidence and should include rational analysis. This is because policies 
that are based on systematic evidence are seen to produce better outcomes.  Such views are 
now commonplace among policymakers in the most developed states: as a result, we find that 
across the Global North, academic researchers are now increasingly tasked with 
demonstrating the relevance and significance of their research, with the quality of work 
measured in terms of the extent to which it has an ‘impact’ on policy (Gunn and Mintrom 
2016).   
EBP has featured prominently in discourses on migration policy and as an 
instrumental – and at times controversial – tool for connecting academia and government. 
While policy-makers may value the evidence produced by academics for its insights and 
potential recommendations, the applied nature of the enterprise also gives researchers access 
to government institutions and additional sources of funding. We note, for example, that the 
European Commission has directed much funding through the Directorate-General for 
Research and Innovation towards ground-breaking research projects, including a number of 
cross-regional studies of migration. Since 1994, approximately 80 projects on migration have 
been funded within the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Framework Programme 
alone. This research has studied different aspects of the migration phenomenon, including 
immigrant integration, temporary/circular migration, trans-nationalism, migration and gender 
relations, migration and development, migration flows, migration data and statistical 
modelling, diversity, economic impact of immigration, and transnational families.3  
Additional funding has been made available more recently under The Societal 
Challenge of the Horizon 2020 Programme: Europe in a Changing World4 and a raft of other 
initiatives (Green European Foundation 2016). As a result there is now a great deal of 
migration-related research channelled through the Research Framework Programmes which 
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aim to give a strategic input into European policy-making (CEC 2009). In addition to 
occasional externally tendered projects through DG Home, the Commission draws on the 
resources of FRONTEX (since 2015, the European Border and Coast Guard) and the 
European Migration Network (EMN) to inform migration policy.  However, there are 
important differences between these investments and those listed above. FRONTEX produces 
risk analyses that seek to inform and predict irregular migration flows, including refugee 
movements, and to this end has established a new FRONTEX Situation Centre (Carrera and 
Hertog 2016).  The EMN (essentially, a network of EEA government agencies) also has an 
applied focus and produces studies on specific policy areas, commissioned by DG Migration 
and Home Affairs, ‘to meet both the long-term and short-term needs of policymakers’ (EMN 
2017). Both of these are lacking in scientific independence and critical appraisal. 
In the UK, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) responded to news of 
Lampedusa shipwrecks by issuing a call under its Urgent Research Grants scheme for 
projects related to what was described as ‘the unfolding migration crisis in the 
Mediterranean’.5  The stated purpose of the call was to ‘test and demonstrate the capability of 
the UK social science community to respond to urgent social crises’. The research was to 
focus primarily on the experiences of those who had made the journey to Europe with 
fieldwork to be undertaken quickly in order to ‘provide a robust evidence base to inform the 
development of policy and responses by governmental, inter-governmental and non-
governmental actors’. At the time of the call it was intended that ‘one, or possibly two’ 
project would be funded under the scheme. However, between the call for proposals and 
decision about which projects would be funded, the ESRC was able to draw upon significant 
additional resources. The source of the funding was the Global Challenges Research Fund 
(GCRF), a 5-year £1.5 billion fund which is drawn from the UK’s Official Development 
Assistance (ODA)6, described by DFID as a prominent component of the UK’s Aid Strategy.7 
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This signalled both a commitment to EBP and the increasing use of development aid and 
financial assistance to manage migration, a theme to which we will return.  
In September 2015, the ESRC announced that eight projects would be funded to 
undertake research on ‘the Mediterranean migration crisis’ with a total budget of £1 million.8  
The projects were directed by leading social scientists at the universities of Coventry, 
Durham, Queen Mary University of London, Loughborough, Middlesex, Warwick and York 
and involved significant collaboration with local researchers, NGOs, and humanitarian 
agencies in Greece, Italy, Turkey and Malta.  Some projects also reached beyond areas of 
reception into both settlements in Calais and along the migration corridor in Serbia, and also 
eventual destination states such as Germany.  These projects were brought together to form 
the ESRC’s Mediterranean Migration Research Programme (MMRP). More than 100 
researchers were involved across the MMRP which produced over 1,000 interviews with 
refugees and migrants, NGOs, humanitarian experts, and government officials from EU 
member states, as well as systematic analysis of migration policy developments within and 
across the countries of the EU.  
The articles in this Special Issue draw on evidence from this programme of research 
and explore the relevance of recent empirical data in formulating the EU’s policy responses 
to the so-called ‘migration crisis’.  Three themes cut across the articles, and link, in this 
volume:  
1. To what extent can we describe migration flows to Europe in 2015 as representing a 
‘crisis’? 
2. If the scale and nature of migration represents a ‘crisis’, to what extent did national 
and European policies respond in ways that alleviated the crisis and its underlying 
causes? 
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3. What was the basis upon which new migration management policies were formed 
in response to the ‘crisis’?  
Drawing upon fieldwork in the Mediterranean and selected sites across the European Union, 
the contributors to this volume seek to provide answers to these questions and in so doing 
unpack some of the dominant assumptions that have guided migration policymaking and 
media reporting on the events that took place in Europe over the period 2015-2017.   
 
Migration trends and EU policy responses  
As noted above, irregular migration to Europe is not new: for more than 30 years, people 
have been crossing the Mediterranean by boat. Similarly, informal settlements from 
Sangatte to the ‘Jungle’ of Calais have appeared at critical crossing points for decades (see 
de Vries and Guild, this volume).  Not only is this information known to students of 
contemporary European history, but also to the European Union institutions which for 
almost 20 years have been grappling with these migration challenges, as evidenced in the 
design of European migration policies.  
Since the 1999 European Council meeting in Tampere, the European Union has 
expressed its ambition to develop a ‘comprehensive approach to migration’ including 
common policies on asylum and immigration.  A central plank of this agenda has been to 
find effective ways to secure the external border of the European Union and to prevent 
onward movements of third country nationals9 through partnerships with countries of 
origin. The attempt to link internal and external policies reflected a greater interest in 
security which has been a constant over the past fifteen years. Since the 2002 Seville 
meeting, every European Council discussion on migration has emphasised the struggle to 
combat ‘illegal immigration’ and address ‘root causes’. To this end, the European Union 
has made cooperation with third countries predicated on other commitments, including a 
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series of readmission agreements that require third countries to readmit their own nationals 
without the right to remain on EU territory.    
Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, the European Council 
expanded partnerships with countries of origin and in so doing broadened the geographical 
reach of its campaign against irregular migration.  European Union states also cooperated 
with each other on intra-state transfers as a result of the 1990 Dublin Convention, which 
entered into force in 1997, and later through further iterations of the Dublin legislation by 
Regulation, including Dublin II [EC 343/2003 of 18 February 2003], Dublin III [EU 
604/2013] and now a proposed Dublin IV (2016).  Ten years after Tampere, the European 
Union succeeded in establishing an asylum ‘acquis’ which includes legislation that seeks to 
align procedures and also promises the fair treatment of third country nationals.10   
The architecture of the European Union’s external policies on migration was named 
the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) in 2005, and included a number 
of programmes that sought to build partnerships with countries of origin where 
development aid and other forms of financial assistance were offered in return for 
cooperation in the struggle against irregular flows, trafficking and organised crime. Yet the 
claim that European Union policy was developed to protect human rights was little more 
than a fig leaf (see Crawley and Blitz, this volume).  Essentially, the core elements of 
European external migration policy became the ‘externalisation’ of migration controls to 
transit and origin countries and ‘preventative measures’ designed to discourage the 
mobility of all but the most highly skilled.  
Throughout the period 2000-2011, the EU strategy of controlling sea borders with the 
cooperation of neighbouring countries appeared to be working. Irregular arrivals by sea 
hovered around 40,000 a year (Canary Islands, Straits of Gibraltar, Italian islands, Malta and 
Greece). By 2010, the western Mediterranean route had been more or less blocked, by means 
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of the Spanish SIVE naval detection system and coastguard enforcement by Morocco and 
Tunisia. The central Mediterranean route had also been blocked with the 2008 Italy-Libya 
Friendship Agreement – essentially, paying Libya’s dictator Q’addafi (Gadafi) significant 
funds to prevent the exit of refugees and other migrants from Libya, despite the lack of any 
protection (see Baldwin-Edwards and Lutterbeck, this volume). The only apparent vulnerable 
point in ‘Fortress Europe’ was the Greek-Turkish land border, which recorded around 60,000 
entries for 2011. To address this gap, FRONTEX in July 2012 launched Operation Aspida on 
the Greek-Turkish land border. The result was that refugees and other migrants were diverted 
to the Aegean sea border, with similar numbers then arriving there. 
By late 2012, however, these policies of containment started to show some cracks. 
The displacement of millions from Syria which had begun in 2011 started to impact Greece, a 
country with no functioning asylum system and which was effectively excluded from the 
Dublin scheme after the 2011 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruling in M.S.S. v 
Belgium and Greece. The ECtHR and subsequently the Court of Justice of the European 
Union found that the repeated failure of the Greek asylum system to afford adequate 
protection was incompatible with European human rights law. Returns to Greece were 
therefore suspended: in effect, this meant that those arriving irregularly in Greece had a carte 
blanche to transit Greece and seek asylum elsewhere in the EU. The response of the EU and 
the Greek authorities was to police the Greek-Italian maritime border, in the hope that they 
would prevent further large-scale secondary flows that were already occurring through that 
route. 
  Things were also beginning to go wrong elsewhere. In March 2011, a multi-state 
NATO-led coalition began a military intervention in Libya which led to the fall of the 
government and eventual capture and death of Q’addafi later the same year.  In the wake of 
the government’s collapse, Italy was obliged to suspend operation of its bilateral agreement 
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with Libya and as a result Libya rapidly became the main departure point for irregular 
migration across the central Mediterranean. With multiple incidents of boats sinking and 
migrants drowning, Italy launched in 2013 its own search and rescue operation, Mare 
Nostrum, which saved more than 1,700 lives: the scheme was abandoned in November 2014 
when the EU refused to finance or support it. By that point, irregular arrivals into Italy were 
rising sharply, having reached more than 160,000 since the beginning of the year.  
The increase in boat traffic corresponded with an upturn in fatalities, including the 
Lampedusa tragedies of April 2015 mentioned above. In response to the disaster, the 
European Council inaugurated the European Agenda on Migration, which explicitly pledged 
to take steps ‘to prevent further loss of life at sea, fight the people smugglers and prevent 
illegal [sic] migration flows’. Further to the meeting of the European Council on 27 May 
2015, the European Union initiated a number of actions which reflected its longstanding 
ambitions to promote border management, cooperation with third countries, and promise of 
refugee protection.  It quickly provided €60 million in emergency funding to Italy and Greece 
and also published guidelines on the implementation of EU rules on the obligation to take 
fingerprints further to Articles 4(1) and 8(1) of the EURODAC Regulation.   
Yet, rather than restart the search and rescue effort, the European Council set its sights 
on curbing migrant smuggling primarily through a new twin agenda of criminalisation on the 
one hand and containment on the other.  Hence, the EU committed resources to tripling the 
capacity of FRONTEX’s joint operations Triton and Poseidon, which aimed to secure the 
maritime borders along the central and eastern Mediterranean routes.  One month later, the 
European Council passed Decision CFSP 2015/778 – legislating for a military operation, 
originally called EUNAVFOR-MED and later renamed Operation Sophia, in the central 
Mediterranean – which aimed to disrupt the business model of smuggling and trafficking 
networks. The EU’s focus on externalisation was evidenced by further aid and development 
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packages. Most notably, it provided €30 million in regional development programmes for 
North Africa and the Horn of Africa and committed itself to establishing a multi-purpose 
centre in Niger, with the intention of curbing flows across the Sahara Desert.   
In truth, the only elements of the European Agenda that reflected the stated interest in 
protecting human rights were the schemes for refugee relocation and resettlement.  These 
initiatives aimed to relocate 40,000 people from Italy and Greece and resettle an additional 
20,000 people from outside the EU.  Although the number of beneficiaries was just a tiny 
fraction of those in need of international protection, the idea of a pan-European resettlement 
scheme was heralded as a major political achievement.  
 Alongside the relocation and resettlement schemes, the EU also instituted  ‘hot-spots’ 
in Italy and Greece to process more efficiently the claims of asylum-seekers who arrived by 
boat or were intercepted by military and civilian patrols.  The hot-spot approach was 
characterised as an innovative way of managing the increasing volume of arrivals in Greece 
and Italy, even though their operation was never defined in EU law and as a result the 
systems in the two countries operated very differently (d’Angelo et al. 2017). Centres on the 
Greek islands of Lesvos, Samos, Chios, Leros and Kos rapidly deteriorated into overcrowded 
closed facilities in contrast to more open processing centres in Sicily (Lampedusa, Trapani 
and Pozzallo) (see d’Angelo, this volume; Vradis and Papousi, this volume). 
 Although the precise content of the European Agenda became more defined over late 
2015 and 2016 with further meetings of the European Council, there was little change in the 
design of the main policy pillars – which emphasised the need to police and curb flows using 
FRONTEX and national agencies, and the management of arrivals through hot-spots, assisted 
by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).  At the same time, the EU produced lists 
and action plans to inform potential returns to designated ‘safe countries of origin’ and, as 
before, the carrot of development assistance was offered to more countries of origin in return 
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for cooperation on controlling irregular migration.  The EU also committed significant funds 
to support the UNHCR and World Food Programme as well as set up Trust Funds for Africa 
and Syria.  The relocation scheme was expanded to provide for up to 120,000 people to be 
relocated, although in practice the numbers that could benefit were severely limited by 
restricting eligibility to those nationalities with an EU asylum recognition rate of more than 
75 per cent (see Kofman, this volume).    
While the EU was testing out its new migration policies, more than 850,000 asylum 
seekers – predominantly Syrians, along with Afghans and Iraqis – rapidly transited through 
Greece to gain entry to the EU via non-EU Balkan countries. The destination of the majority 
of these migrants was Germany, a country where the Chancellor Angela Merkel had publicly 
announced that Syrian refugees would be welcome.. Yet, the creation of the ‘Balkan route’ 
generated new political crises as states responded one after the other by closing their borders.  
As a result, the operation of the Common European Asylum System, the Dublin Regulation 
and the functioning of the Schengen Agreement (permitting passport-free movement of 
nationals of contracting states) were all called into question.  Moreover, the decision by 
Hungary in September 2015 to build a fence along its borders with Serbia and Croatia, tore at 
the EU’s claims of solidarity. Not only did the Hungarian border fence divert refugees and 
other migrants into countries that had previously received few arrivals, and were therefore ill-
equipped to respond, but more importantly this action set the scene for further coercive 
attempts at border management across the EU and among its neighbours.  
By October 2015, around 10,000 people were arriving on the Greek islands every day 
– with no sign that the flow would decrease any time soon.  It was against this background 
that the European Council initiated a joint action plan with Turkey which paved the way for 
further significant transfers of financial assistance and the framework for what would become 
the EU-Turkey agreement, implemented in March 2016 with the specific – and explicitly 
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stated – objective of reducing the number of refugees and other migrants arriving in EU 
territory. At the same time, one by one, Greece’s western neighbours followed Hungary’s 
example and closed their borders. By 8 March 2016, all the Balkan borders were closed for 
asylum-seekers wishing to exit Greece. Tens of thousands of people became blocked at 
different borders in Europe, or in temporary makeshift camps established whilst they – and 
panic-stricken governments across Europe – decided what to do next.   
In March 2016, the eastern border with Turkey was formally closed subsequent to an 
agreement of 18 March.  The so-called EU-Turkey Statement determined inter alia that all 
irregular migrants and rejected asylum-seekers arriving in Greece after the cut-off date of 20 
March would be returned to Turkey; that for every Syrian returned from Greece another 
would be resettled directly from Turkey to the EU (with a complex proviso that initially 
18,000 would be resettled, followed by potentially another 54,000); that Turkey would take 
measures to prevent all irregular migration from Turkey to the EU; and that an allocated 
funding of €3bn from the Facility for Refugees in Turkey would be available, with another 
potential €3bn up to the end of 2018. 
While the agreement between the EU and Turkey contained the eastern border of 
Europe, it also generated new protection challenges for the thousands of stranded refugees 
and other migrants caught between inhospitable national borders or in informal and 
precarious settlements.  Over 4,000 asylum-seekers languished, some for over a year, in 
closed detention centres in Moria on Lesvos. Others were stuck in Serbia while those who 
had reached Calais, and possibly had hoped to cross to the UK, experienced repeated abuse 
by the French police and saw their settlements destroyed.   
The central Mediterranean route via Libya had remained open during 2016, utilised 
by refugees and migrants primarily from countries of West, Central and East Africa. 
Following the success of the EU-Turkey agreement in stemming the flow of refugees and 
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other migrants from Turkey to Greece, Europe’s politicians were keen to replicate the deal 
with Libya – to stop the arrival of people into Italy. Since Libya does not possess a coherent 
government and is also a dangerous place for refuges and other migrants, the arrangement 
with Libya could not simply replicate the arrangement with Turkey. In early 2017, Italy 
concluded a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding with Libya’s UN-backed government 
headed by al-Sarraj, which at the February 2017 EU summit in Malta was endorsed by the 
EU as a whole (see Baldwin-Edwards and Lutterbeck, this volume). This bilateral deal was 
followed up by unspecified deals made between Italy and local governments in Libya, 
allegedly paying off militia groups engaged in the trafficking and smuggling of migrants to 
Italy. By July 2017, the flow of refugees and other migrants started to diminish, and the deal 
was enthusiastically hailed as another success in blocking a major migration route into the 
EU. 
Thus, by 2017 the EU’s external migration policy was focused primarily on sealing 
Turkey and Libya as the two main transit routes into Europe, the continuation of promoting 
capacity-building of non-EU countries in the Mediterranean region to host refugees and other 
migrants alongside blocking migration flows, and addressing the ‘root causes’ of migration in 
countries of origin. Irregular flows into Italy and Greece continued, albeit at low levels, with 
weak capacity of these two countries to host and manage the mixed flows, while the actual 
protection afforded those in Libya, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and other countries of the 
region remained unknown. In the case of Libya, the main transit country of the central 
Mediterranean route, the experiences of refugees and other migrants have been increasingly 
well documented with widely reported incidents of kidnapping, forced labour, torture and 
death (Crawley et al. 2018). 
 
The gap between evidence and policy  
14 
 
Why then, given the history of migration to Europe and the plethora of evidence that has 
been produced across the EU and made available to policymakers, has the EU response to 
the ‘migration crisis’ been so problematic?  There are several possible explanations for 
this, not least the many problems and paradoxes inherent in the concept of EBP. For the 
purpose of this introduction, it is worth highlighting three particular issues that explain, in 
large part, the ongoing and substantial ‘gap’ between a significant body of evidence 
examining migration processes including the drivers of migration to Europe, and the policy 
response. 
First, it is important to note that the gap between evidence on the drivers of 
migration to Europe and the policy response is not limited or specific to the issue of 
migration. Rather, it reflects a deeper problem with the concept of EBP which parallels the 
long-standing ‘paradigm war’ in social research between positivist, interpretivist and 
critical approaches.  In particular, the definition of ‘evidence’ for the purpose of migration 
policymaking is often reliant upon quantitative data and statistical analysis (e.g., that 
provided by FRONTEX) that can provide a straightforward numerical description of the 
issue(s) and steer the policy response in a specific direction, the success or otherwise of 
which can be easily measured. In truth, the world is more complex than this, and data in 
the area of migration and asylum policy continue to be subject to definitional and spatial 
limitations that are exacerbated by rapid changes and incorrect usage and interpretation 
(Singleton 2016). In other words, the nature of what counts as ‘evidence’ is itself contested 
and challenged. 
Secondly, it is clear – regardless of how ‘evidence’ is defined and characterised – 
that research is only one component of the evidence that shapes and informs EBP. At each 
stage of the policy process, a number of different factors will also affect policy. This 
occurs both at an individual level – for example, a policymaker’s own experience, 
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expertise and judgement – and at an institutional level, for example in terms of institutional 
capacity (Sutcliffe and Court 2005). It also occurs at the broader level of policy narratives 
– in other words, the story that is constructed about the role of a particular policy or set of 
policies and the purpose that ‘evidence’ plays in this process of narrative construction 
(Boswell et al. 2011). Boswell et al. argue that many aspects of migration policy can be 
characterised as areas of risk, with policymakers invoking different knowledge claims, 
sometimes based on evidence from research, other times drawing on management data or 
other forms of evidence to construct and/or support particular policy narratives. 
This takes us to the third, and perhaps most important, aspect of EBP – namely, the 
political context within which policymaking takes place. This aspect is how evidence is 
incorporated into policymaking, the stage at which it is taken into account and the use(s) to 
which it is put. The positivist, empiricist worldview that underpins the theory and practice 
of EBP has largely failed to address the key elements of the policymaking process and the 
complex social and political realities within which policymaking takes place (Greenhalgh 
and Russell 2009). In particular, a narrow ‘evidence-based’ framing of policymaking is 
inherently unable to explore the complex, context-dependent and value-laden way in which 
competing options are negotiated by individuals and interest groups.  Policymaking is, as 
Sutcliffe and Court suggest, ‘neither objective nor neutral; it is an inherently political 
process’ (2005, iii). Although this has implications for EBP across all policy domains, the 
politics of policymaking is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the area of migration and 
asylum – issues that have become deeply politicised at the national and regional levels. We 
note, for example, that in the case of the EMN studies, the emphasis on evaluation is often 
at the expense of critical insight.  The studies tend to address the question ‘How well does 
EU policy work in achieving its stated goals?’ There is little or no critical reflection, no 
attempt to challenge the stated goals or analyse why migrations are occurring and what the 
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constitutive elements of ‘mixed flows’ of persons may imply for alternative policy 
responses.    
Following from the ontological biases listed above, it is helpful to consider the 
following additional explanations.   
 
Assumption led policymaking 
Throughout the ‘crisis’, EU member states – and in particular the UK – suggested that 
refugees and other migrants were drawn to Europe by a variety of ‘pull factors’, including 
better employment opportunities, social security, access to healthcare and other benefits.  
This emphasis on pull versus push factors is regularly asserted, with politicians making 
assumptions about the factors shaping migrants’ decision making – speaking for them, but 
not listening to their own accounts and reasons for deciding to leave or move on (Crawley 
et al. 2017, 2018).  In addition, it is clear from the outline of EU policy developments 
above that European migration policy has been preoccupied with curbing irregular flows 
and addressing the criminal aspects of smuggling and trafficking. Yet, in spite of much 
evidence presented by academics and by refugees and migrants themselves, there has been 
an unwillingness to accept the complex and mixed nature of migration flows.  We note that 
there is often an overlapping relationship between ‘forced’ and ‘economic’ drivers of 
migration and that many of those who left their home countries primarily for economic 
reasons may effectively have been recast as refugees – for example, as a result of abusive 
and exploitative practices in Libya and elsewhere (Crawley and Skleparis 2017).  As a 
result, many people have been excluded from international protection.  While Syrians have 
overwhelmingly benefited from both the granting of asylum status and participation in the 
EU relocation scheme, other nationalities have been denied such opportunities even though 
they may have equally pressing claims for protection.  A recent survey of 700 boat 
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migrants who reached Sicily and Greece found that only 18 per cent described themselves 
as ‘economic migrants’, the vast majority having come from refugee-producing states and 
who had escaped conflict and political turmoil (see EVI-MED 2017). This evidence is in 
line with that of IOM (2016), which found that economic or work reasons were the main 
reasons for migration among only 24 per cent of the 1,031 refugees and migrants they 
interviewed. 
 
Interest led policy-making – a convenient ‘crisis’  
Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins (2016) argue that the 2015 ‘migration crisis’ cannot be 
treated solely as a crisis, since the solutions have built on pre-existing practices and 
actually helped to consolidate them.  This is a view shared by van Reekum (2016) who 
notes the phenomenon of ‘routinized emergency’ acting to ‘naturalize’ migration politics.  
In the case of the European Union, such practices are well-documented. As we argue 
above, there is a line of continuity between the Tampere and Seville European Council 
decisions and the 2015 European Agenda on Migration.  The EU’s commitment to 
‘manage’ migration flows is further evidenced in external policies that build on top of a 
raft of migration partnerships and schemes.  The most obvious legacy of this approach is in 
the design of the EU-Turkey agreement. 
 Further, the events described above relate to an emergency situation which enabled 
the EU to expand its competences.  Again, the focus on smuggling, irregular flows and the 
criminalisation of migration dominated the agenda.  Blockmans (2016) sees the 2015 crisis 
as an ideal opportunity for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to acquire a 
bigger role in EU policies – something borne out by the recent reconfiguration of 
FRONTEX as a semi-militarised European Border and Coast Guard. We might also argue 
that casting migration as a security issue, and addressing it through the CDSP, was a less 
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problematic way forward for EU policymakers when confronted by highly divergent 
national positions on the management of external immigration flows. 
 
Nationalising migration policy 
With the creation of a ‘Balkan route’, EU member states took action to close their borders, 
and saw the pillars of EU policy – the operation of the CEAS, the Dublin Regulation and 
the Schengen Agreement – abrogated in favour of restrictive and nationalised policies that 
appealed to domestic audiences. In particular, Central European states – above all, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland – presented their actions as natural responses to 
the inflows of migrants. These actions were defended in the name of border management, 
national sovereignty, social cohesion – the lexicon of populism.  Thus, while the European 
Union expanded its competences in protecting the EU’s external border, its internal 
borders hardened – to the benefit of chauvinistic national governments.  
 
Rewriting the rules of the game 
The framing of migration management as a crisis has been used to justify extraordinary and 
exceptional measures, characterised as rapid, informal and flexible policy instruments at odds 
with the rule of law and the fundamental rights of migrants. The expansion and multiplication 
of borders – physical, technological and mental – is seen as the cause of long and fragmented 
journeys, denying access through legal routes and particularly problematic for persons 
seeking international protection. As Ansems de Vries et al. (2016) argue, the fractured and 
complex journeys of migrants, and the dramatic effect of increasingly coercive policies where 
migrants are pushed back from one country to another, and borders become extended zones 
of hold-up, pushback and/or violence, fundamentally undermine the potential for settlement.  
The system works against the institution of asylum.  
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The stories unheard 
The articles in this Special Issue engage directly with the complex relationship between 
evidence on migration processes and the policymaking process. What becomes clear from 
the stories they tell us about different aspects of EU migration policy and practice is that 
the aspiration – as expressed in the ESRC’s Urgent Grant Call – for robust evidence to 
inform the development of policy and responses by governmental, inter-governmental and 
non-governmental actors is not, in itself, sufficient to produce meaningful impact. The 
failings of the EU’s response to increased migration were not through a lack of robust 
evidence on ‘what works’: rather, because this evidence was viewed as insufficiently 
convincing relative to the other forms of evidence available to policymakers. Such 
evidence was also over-ruled by the perceived political imperative of controlling and 
limiting migration.  
This volume examines the internal contradictions in the design of European policy. 
One unifying theme is the problematic lens of ‘crisis’.  Leonie Ansems de Vries and Elspeth 
Guild explore this concept through the perspective of transit points, which they describe as 
the kind of spaces that people seeking refuge pass through – including informal sites such as 
railways stations, parks and ad hoc camps as well as institutionalised spaces such as reception 
centres, detention centres and hotspots. The authors describe how the ‘Jungle’ in Calais 
turned into a (semi-)permanent place of passage and residence owing to the closed border 
with the UK and how other spaces have become sites of significant human rights abuses 
where people are often detained unlawfully.  Ansems de Vries and Guild also highlight the 
ineffective way in which transit points are used to manage migration flows, arguing that 
‘eviction and destruction has not stopped people from moving through and staying in 
informal places’.  One particularly telling contribution this article makes is in its description 
of the ways in which policy frameworks structure the experience of migration and as a result 
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of multiple and overlapping forms of coercive measures undermine opportunities for 
settlement.    
Vicki Squire and Nina Perkowski take issue with the European Agenda on Migration 
and the Union’s emphasis on tackling the issue of smuggling and trafficking.  Drawing upon 
257 interviews carried out with 271 people who travelled across the Mediterranean Sea by 
boat using smuggling networks, the authors look at the complex co-relationship between 
smuggling and anti-smuggling initiatives – arguing that the European Union has been 
distracted by a focus on the criminal actors and actions that enable people to reach places of 
safety, rather than focusing on the criminal regimes from which people are fleeing in their 
search for international protection.   
Squire and Perkowski note that, from the individual perspective, the absence of choice 
undermines a moral argument against smuggling and they unpick the logic of ‘good versus 
bad smuggling’. Drawing on concepts of ‘anti-politics’, they demonstrate how policies have 
emerged in response to the problem of managing ‘bad things’.  Whereas ‘good smugglers’ 
provide a service, ‘bad smugglers’ are considered to be ‘interested only in financial gain, and 
potentially cheating, threatening, abusing, or risking the lives of their ‘customers’ to 
maximise their profits’. In this way, Squire and Perkowski’s article highlights a plurality of 
approaches to smuggling, some of which may involve cooperation with smugglers and reduce 
rather than increase harm.  These counter-narratives expose the limitations of the European 
Union’s approach to the issue of smuggling.  Squire and Perkowski further explain that rather 
than functioning as a consistent and logical set of operations that seek to curb the exploitative 
practice of human smuggling, the European Union’s approach has in fact given way to a 
series of contested practices that seek to transform migrant smuggling networks from ‘low 
risk, high return’ operations into ‘high risk, low return’ ones’ – with devastating 
consequences for refugees and other migrants caught in the middle. They argue that the EU’s 
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legitimacy may be called into question by the rising number of deaths at sea, in spite of 
increasingly sophisticated intelligence networks.   
 Eleonore Kofman similarly seeks to deconstruct EU policy and expose its underlying 
biases – in this instance, the designation of vulnerability and the gendered implications for 
the EU’s relocation scheme.  Exploring the nature of ‘gendered mobilities’, Kofman argues 
that the absence of socially disaggregated data for differentiating between the needs of adults 
and children masks a wider challenge in the conceptualisation of categories of vulnerability. 
It is not just women and children as a whole who are classified as vulnerable, but sub-
categories such as pregnant women, single parents or unaccompanied minors who are 
deemed to be the most dependent and in need of additional support and who should be given 
priority in terms of reception support and relocation. 
The application of ‘vulnerability’ to the reception of asylum seekers and the 
privileging of certain nationalities for those eligible for relocation have created a series of 
hierarchies and stratifications.  Drawing upon empirical data from UNHCR and national 
sources in Greece and Italy as well as original data generated by the EVI-MED project, 
Kofman argues that in practice the way in which people are deemed to be vulnerable 
privileges certain categories over others.  Those omitted tend to be those who experienced 
emotional trauma. Kofman also describes how vulnerability is conceptualised in gendered 
terms.  For example, single women travelling alone who encounter dangerous and threatening 
situations and gender-based violence. She identifies two very different sub-systems such that 
the increasing feminisation of the refugee flow occurred only in the eastern Mediterranean – 
dominated by Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan populations – in contrast to the central Mediterranean 
where the major flows emanate from East and West Africa, and the female population 
actually decreased from the end of 2015. On this basis, Kofman argues that these shifts have 
been used to exclude men from the category of vulnerable persons, highlighting how gender 
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has featured in discourses on migration and fuelled anti-immigrant platforms. The supposed 
absence or small number of women travelling to Europe has been used by anti-immigrant 
social media sites to argue that men fleeing conflict zones are cowards, and unwilling to 
safeguard vulnerable women and children – and therefore are not vulnerable.    
 The article by Anna Papoutsi and Antonis Vradis focuses on the operation of the 
reception system, and in particular the use of hotspots in Greece and Italy, highlighting 
multiple abuses that undermine the European Union’s claim to protect the rights of migrants. 
The authors argue that international protection systems for asylum seekers effectively cease 
to apply on large swathes of Greek territory. ‘Hotspots’ allow the state and the EU to further 
separate citizens and non-citizens into categories of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ 
populations and through the use of pre-registration systems manage their mobility by creating 
further ambiguous categories.  In this way, Papoutsi and Vradis argue, the hotspots are 
liminal spaces that institutionalise mobility yet also facilitate the immobility of transit 
populations.  The use of these sites results in a forced detachment between territory and 
population such that migrants encamped in hotspots are no longer citizens, dwellers or 
bearers of any other residence-derived rights.  They are simply populations passing through. 
Alessio d’Angelo, writing on the management of reception systems in Italy, similarly 
notes how the ‘hotspot’ approach in Italy has turned the idea of refugee protection and 
migration management on its head: d’Angelo argues that the institutionalisation of hotspots in 
Agrigento, Lampedusa, Taranto, Trapani and Pozzallo has effectively created an ‘illegality 
factory’. The Italian system of reception for refugees and migrants involves a galaxy of state 
and non-governmental actors and a multi-tier classification of services and centres operating 
in an overcomplicated system created from confused and contradictory legislation. Yet, just 
as in Greece, where officials are assisted by FRONTEX and EASO, the hotspots act as a 
sorting office. The process of illegality management begins at this point, because in spite of 
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the notice of rejection given to many, individuals are not removed but ‘virtually expelled’ or 
assisted to leave, with gates to centres deliberately left open or – as with the smugglers in 
Squire and Perkowski’s account – the police facilitating their exit by taking migrants to rural 
areas so they can ‘disappear’. 
The agreement with Turkey in March 2016 which has significantly reduced the flow 
of refugees and migrants to Greece, presents operational challenges on both sides of the 
Aegean. Yet, as Frank Düvell argues, in Turkey as in Europe, the police and border 
enforcement agencies play an ambiguous role. Drawing upon interviews undertaken in 
Greece and Turkey he describes the competing motivations of individuals, state actors and 
social networks in the outflow of migrants from Turkey to Greece.  He identifies an 
assemblage of macro, meso and micro-level drivers which includes geographical borders, 
official policies, hostile and migrant discourses, social processes, routes and movements; he 
considers smuggling to be symptomatic of the extraordinarily restrictive conditions that 
permit entry to the European Union.  Although Turkey is often criticised for a plethora of 
support for smugglers and, in turn, for refugees and migrants seeking to cross the Aegean, 
Duvell also records how informal structures have provided support – including mosques and 
NGOs – which help to determine onward journeys and cater to those left stranded.  
 The problem of stranded migrants is further explored by Martin Baldwin-Edwards 
and Derek Lutterbeck who examine the importance of Libya as a transit state and the 
situation for those crossing to Europe via the central Mediterranean route. The authors 
describe how the EU has accommodated abuse in Libya by tolerating a contradictory 
relationship between the security of the state versus the security of the migrant. Although the 
Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration is the ‘official’ agency responsible for 
overseeing the management of detention centres, Baldwin-Edwards and Lutterbeck argue that 
these are controlled by militia beyond the reach of the Ministry of the Interior.  The 2017 
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arrangement between Italy and various Libyan authorities has resulted in a large stock of 
migrants being stranded in Libya and in need of international protection – in a country where 
the UNHCR and the EU have almost no access or influence, and which is controlled by three 
competing governments with extensive militia activities and a recent history of extreme abuse 
and violence towards migrants. 
The final article by Heaven Crawley and Brad Blitz revisits the relationship between 
the EU’s policies of migration management and the use of financial aid and development 
assistance to control flows to Europe, focusing on the ways in which ODA and other forms of 
development assistance have been used to externalise the borders of the EU and limit 
potential flows from the Horn of Africa.  Drawing on data from two of the projects funded as 
part of the MMRP – MEDMIG and EVI-MED – the article charts the development of EU 
cooperation with countries of origin, from the Tampere Council to the multiplication of 
development programmes and readmission agreements with third countries over the past 15 
years.  Although these initiatives are purported to advance a ‘common agenda’, it is clear that 
they are increasingly being orientated towards the political aspirations and needs of the EU.  
 Drawing upon data from interviews and surveys with 128 people originating from 
Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Sudan, the authors argue that the development of 
regional cooperation initiatives, further to the agreement between the EU and Turkey reflect a 
series of assumptions about the factors driving migration from the region – including the 
belief that poverty, not political oppression or human rights abuse, is a principal cause for 
outflows. Rather, the empirical data record that persecution, insecurity and the absence of 
access to rights – in countries of origin and neighbouring countries in the region – shape 
individual decisions to move onwards towards Europe and hence fundamentally challenge 
some of the premises underlying both the European Agenda on Migration and the idea that 
robust and timely evidence alone can shape the policy agenda. The authors conclude that the 
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lack of coherence between the EU’s ambitions to control irregular migration and the 
prevailing rights-violating contexts in which the EU seeks to engage, threatens to create 
further political destabilisation which may ultimately increase, rather than decrease, outward 
migration from the region.  
 While Europe has grappled with the reception and integration of more than one 
million refugees and migrants who crossed the Mediterranean in 2015, and a further 364,000 
that arrived during the course of 2016, these articles unpack the relationship between what we 
know of the reasons why people risk their lives, and those of their families, to make the 
crossing and the EU’s policy response to the ‘crisis’ – which has failed to deliver protection,  
curb the need for smugglers to access Europe or prevent deaths at sea.  In September 2017 the 
European Commission released a statement claiming that ‘good progress’ had been made in 
managing migration flows and encouraging all parties ‘to sustain and further accelerate the 
good progress made in managing irregular migration flows, protecting the EU external 
borders and supporting the frontline Member States under pressure’.11 This volume 
challenges the idea that the European Agenda on Migration is internally consistent and an 
effective means of managing the arrival and integration of refugees and migrants crossing the 
Mediterranean.  It also raises important questions about how the future of migration policy in 
Europe, with the EU reliant upon Turkey and diverse actors in Libya to manage its external 
borders – both countries with significant refugee and migrant populations and with serious 
human rights concerns.  There is increasing evidence that the logic of containment and 
‘sorting’, which runs through many of the policy initiatives discussed in the articles, is being 
applied in neighbouring states. This raises additional questions about the European Union’s 
position as a protector and advocate of human rights.  For both the European Union and the 
UK government (which has funded the research that underpins the articles in this volume), 
these findings are of great importance. Whether, and how, these findings will be used to 
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inform the future development of migration policy in Europe represents a further test of our 
politicians’ commitment to evidence-based policy.  
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